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THE INCREASING RISK OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS-THE
MOST DANGEROUS PART OF AIR TRAVEL MAY BE THE
TIME SPENT ON THE GROUND
Kenneth M. Thomas*
"Taxiing on the airport surface is the most hazardous phase offlight."
- Jane Garvey, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, in her opening remarks at the Runway Safety Na-
tional Summit, June 2000.'
"When I board an aircraft, I believe that the greatest threat to my life
is a collision on the runway."
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
ALPA Air Line Pilots Association
AMASS Airport Movement Area Safety System
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ASDE (-3, -X) Airport Surface Detection Equipment
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System
ATC Air Traffic Control (including ground control)
ATP Airline Transport Pilot
CFR Code of Federal Regulations (for Aeronautics and
Space)
DOT Department of Transportation
DOT/IG Inspector General of the Department of
Transportation
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
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GPS Global Positioning System
GSTARS Ground Safety Tracking and Reporting System
HUD Heads-Up Display
[AHSO Land and Hold Short Operations
LOT "Loop" Technology
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OED Operational Error / Deviation (causing a runway
incursion)
PD Pilot Deviation (causing a runway incursion)
PIP Program Implementation Plan
RSP Runway Safety Program
RWSL Runway Safety Lights
TRIR Total Runway Incursion Rate
VPD Vehicle Operator or Pedestrian Deviation (causing a
runway incursion)
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a common axiom that the drive to the airport is more
dangerous than the flight to the destination. If the current
trend in airport ground safety continues, the trip between the
gate and the runway may become the most dangerous portion of
air travel.
The world's worst civilian aviation accident occurred on
March 27, 1977, when two commercially operated Boeing 747s
collided, killing 583 of the 613 people onboard both aircraft.
With the increasingly crowded skies over most parts of the
world, this type of accident was seemingly inevitable. However,
this accident did not occur in the skies. The accident occurred
on a fog-covered runway on Tenerife in the Canary Islands. As a
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 747 began its takeoff roll, another
747 operated by Pan Am was taxiing down the same runway in
the opposite direction. When the KLM crew saw the other air-
craft, they attempted an early take-off, but the two jumbo-jets
collided and burst into flames. All 235 people aboard the KLM
jet were killed. The Pan Am jet was cut in half, killing 348
people.
In aviation parlance, this type of accident is known as a "run-
way incursion." In the aftermath of the Tenerife accident, the
aviation industry and aviation agencies around the world prom-
ised to reduce the potential for runway incursions. But, in the
twenty-five years since the Tenerife disaster, runway incursions
in the United States have been occurring at an increasing rate.
548
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The goal of this article is to discuss the historical background of
the runway incursion problem in the United States and to assess
the response by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
other aviation authorities in an effort to continue to ensure that
aviation remains the safest form of travel.
Part II provides a background study of the runway incursion
problem, including the statistical rise in runway incursions. Part
III discusses the current state of technological development of
systems designed to aid pilots and air traffic controllers in
preventing runway incursions. Part IV discusses potential meth-
ods for reducing the occurrence of human error leading to run-
way incursions. Part V discusses the initiatives started by the
FAA in the last decade to reduce the runway incursion problem.
Part VI discusses the current direction of the FAA in its effort to
reduce runway incursions. Finally, Part VII concludes with a cri-
tique of the FAA's actions aimed at reducing runway incursions.
II. A BASIC STUDY OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS3
A. WHAT IS A RUNWAY INCURSION?
The FAA defines a "runway incursion" as "any occurrence at
an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the
ground that creates a collision hazard or results in the loss of
separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to takeoff, land-
ing, or intending to land."4 The term "loss of separation" means
that the aircraft and objects involved were closer together than
allowed by air traffic control (ATC) requirements.5 According
to the FAA, if an aircraft within one mile of landing is forced to
abort the approach due to an aircraft, vehicle, or pedestrian on
the runway, the event will be classified as a runway incursion.6
A "surface incident" is a less serious event that involves a viola-
tion of Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), but does not result
in a collision hazard or a loss of separation.7 For example, if an
aircraft or vehicle entered a runway without ATC's permission,
3 The FAA's current website devoted to runway safety is located at http://
www.faarsp.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
4 FAA, AVIATION SAFETY STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, at G-5 (1999) [hereinafter
SAFETY STATISTICS HANDBOOK].
5 Id.
6 FAA, Runway Incursion Corner, at http://www.faa.gov/avr/news/new/
RunwayI.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Runway Incursion Corner].
7 FAA Press Release, Fact Sheet: Runway Safety Program (Mar. 27, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.faa.gov/apa/Factsheet/2000/fact3Mar.htm.
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but there was no risk of collision, the FAA would classify the
event as a surface incident.'
In layman's terms, a runway incursion occurs if an aircraft
comes too close to another aircraft, vehicle, or pedestrian dur-
ing the critical take-off and landing phases of flight. Based on
the FAA's broad definition, a runway incursion includes both
collisions and "near-misses." The FAA notes that most runway
incursions are caused by human error rather than equipment
failure.'
Interestingly, the FAA's definition of runway incursion applies
only to airports with operating control towers.1 0 However, only
a small percentage of U.S. airports have operating control tow-
ers. It is unclear why the FAA limits its runway incursion defini-
tion to control tower airports, but it is probable that this
limitation may arise from the fact that data is easier to obtain
from airports with more formalized control and safety struc-
tures. Also, the severity of runway incursions at controlled air-
ports, where the vast majority of air carrier activity occurs, is
greater due to the potential risk to life of a single collision be-
tween commercial air carrier aircraft. As such, the FAA may be
focusing its data collection efforts on those airports that pose
the greatest danger to the flying public.
B. CAUSES OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS
The FAA has divided the causes of runway incursions into
four broad categories: (1) Pilot Deviations; (2) Operational Er-
rors; (3) Operational Deviations; and (4) Vehicle/Pedestrian
Deviations. "
1. Pilot Deviations (PD)
A Pilot Deviation is an action taken by a pilot that violates the
FARs. 12 For example, a pilot may taxi onto an active runway
without obtaining the proper clearance from ATC. There are
8 See Runway Incursion Corner, supra note 6.
' Federal Aviation Administration's Runway Incursion Program: Hearing on FAA Re-
port No. AV-1998-015 Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 1, 4 (1998) (statement
of Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation)
[hereinafter Mead Statement].
See id.
SAFETY ST-ATisrics HANDBOOK, supra note 4.
12 Id.
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currently over 635,000 registered pilots in the United States, 3
any of whom may be involved in a runway incursion. Further-
more, over 225,000 aircraft are registered in the United States.14
Since the FAA began taking runway incursion data in 1988, Pilot
Deviations accounted for approximately 48% of all runway in-
cursions. 15 In recent years, Pilot Deviations have risen to ac-
count for approximately 60% of all runway incursions.
16
2. Operational Errors / Deviations (OED)
An Operational Error is an occurrence attributable to ATC
that either results in a loss of separation distance between an
aircraft and another object or causes an aircraft to land on a
closed runway.1 7 Any air traffic controller can be involved in a
runway incursion. There are approximately 15,000 air traffic
controllers in the United States.'"
A clear example of Operational Error is a 1991 accident at the
Los Angles International Airport where the air traffic controller
directed a commuter aircraft to taxi into position on the active
runway and then cleared another aircraft to land on the same
runway, resulting in a fatal collision.'"
Operational Deviations, by contrast, occur when the mini-
mum required separation distance is maintained between the
aircraft and other objects, but an ATC facility causes an aircraft
to enter (or come close to entering) airspace under the control
of another ATC facility without prior approval.20 Since the FAA
began taking runway incursion data in 1988, Operational Er-
rors/Deviations accounted for approximately 31% of all runway
incursions.2'
"3 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n, Active Certified Pilots - Table (Dec. 31,
1999), at http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/stats/fctcrd01.html.
14 Id.
'5 Data derived from Table I, infra Part II.C.
16 Id.
17 SAFETY STATISTICS HANDBOOK, supra note 4.
18 FAA RUNWAY SAFETY REPORT: RUNWAY INCURSION SEVERITY TRENDS AT Tow-
ERED AIRPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1997-2000) 5 (2001) [hereinafter RUNWAY
INCURSION SEVERITY REPORT].
19 NTSB, Accident Synopsis No. DCA91MA018B, available at http://www.tsb.
gov/NTSB/query.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter LAX Accident].
20 SAFETY STATISTICS HANDBOOK, supra note 4.
21 Data derived from Table I, infra Part II.C.
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3. Vehicle Operator/Pedestrian Deviations (VPD)
Vehicle and Pedestrian Deviations result from a "vehicle oper-
ator, non-pilot operator of an aircraft, or pedestrian who devi-
ates onto the [airport surface] movement area (including the
runway) without ATC authorization. '22 As many air travelers
have seen, the runways and taxiways of an airport are crowded
with aircraft, as well as vehicles and personnel. Collision risk is
inherent in this type of environment. Since the FAA began tak-
ing runway incursion data in 1988, Vehicle and Pedestrian Devi-
ations accounted for approximately 21% of all runway
incursions.23
C. THE INCREASING RISK OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS
1. A Decades-Old Problem
Ground collisions between aircraft and other aircraft or
ground objects have been documented as early as 1929.24 The
following examples illustrate historic, worldwide events that
would be classified as runway incursions under the current FAA
definition:
* In 1977, 583 people were killed when two Boeing 747s col-
lided on a fog-shrouded runway at the Tenerife airport in
the Canary Islands. One aircraft attempted to take-off in
the fog as another aircraft was taxing down the same run-
way in the opposite direction. 25
* In 1983, two commercial airliners collided on the runway
in Madrid, Spain, killing 100 people. 26
* In 1984, the pilot of a small business jet made an early
take-off to avoid hitting a DC-9 that had taxied onto the
runway. The business jet passed just ten feet over the com-
mercial airliner.2 7
22 SAFETY STATISTICS HANDBOOK, supra note 4.
23 Data derived from Table I, infra Part II.(C).
24 See Greunke v. N. Am. Airways Co., 230 N.W. 618 (Wis. 1930) (lawsuit arising
from collision between landing aircraft and aircraft parked on runway).
25 Jodie Peeler, Tenerife and Sioux City: Two Case Studies in Communication Among
Airline Flight Crews (Aug. 20, 1999), at http://129.252.83.77/papers/08201999
peeler.html.
26 Increasing Number of Aircraft Mishaps on Our Nation's Runways: Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S.
House of Representatives, 105th Cong. (Nov. 13, 1997) (testimony of Honorable Jim
Hall, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board) (transcript available at
http://avweb.com/other/hal19746.html) [hereinafter Hall Testimony].
27 NTSB, REPORT No. NTSB/SIR-86-10, RUNWAY INCURSIONS AT CONTROLLED
AIRPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 NTSB REPORT].
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0 In 1988, the pilot of a small, single engine aircraft was
forced to abort a landing at an uncontrolled airport when
a construction vehicle pulled onto the runway as the air-
craft was descending for its final approach.28
* In 1990, eight people died and thirty-six were injured
when a Boeing 727 and a DC-9, both operated by North-
west Airlines, collided on a fog-covered runway in Detroit,
Michigan. 29
* In 1990, one person was killed in Atlanta, Georgia, when a
Boeing 727 landed and collided with a small, twin-engine
aircraft that had not taxied clear of the runway. °
* In 1991, thirty-four people were killed when a Boeing 737
landed and collided with a commuter aircraft stopped on
the runway at the Los Angeles International Airport.3
* In 1994, the occupants of a small twin-engine aircraft were
killed when the aircraft taxied into the path of a DC-9
landing on the same runway in St. Louis, Missouri.32
* In 1996, a twin-engine business aircraft taxied onto a run-
way at an uncontrolled airport in Quincy, Illinois as a com-
muter aircraft was landing, killing fourteen people.33
* In 1999, four separate incidents occurred (two at Chicago
O'Hare, one at Los Angeles, one at JFK in New York) in
which a commercial airliner on take-off flew within 300
feet of another commercial airliner that had taxied onto
the runway.34
28 The author of this article was piloting the aircraft while building flight hours
towards a Private Pilot's License.
2:) NTSB, Accident Synopsis No. DCA91MA010B, available at http://www.ntsb.
gov/NTSB/query.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
30 NTSB, SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-00-66/-71, 1 (July 6, 2000) [hereinafter
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION].
31 LAX Accident, supra note 19.
32 NTSB, Accident Synopsis No. CHI95MA044A, available at http://www.ntsb.
gov/NTSB/query.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter St. Louis Accident].
33 NTSB, Accident Synopsis No. DCA97MA009A, available at http://www.ntsb.
gov/NTSB/query.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
34 CNN, Congressman Calls for Summit on Runway Near-Collisions (Feb. 1, 2000),
at http://cnn.net/2000/US/02/01/runway.near.miss.0I/index.html; see Press
Release, NTSB, Safety Recommendation to the Federal Aviation Administration
to Prevent Runway Incursions (June 13, 2000), available at http://www.itsasafety.
org/pressrel/2000/000613.htm [hereinafter NTSB Press Release].
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* In March 1999, four people were killed when two single-
engine private aircraft collided on a runway in Sarasota,
Florida.15
* On October 31, 2000, a Singapore Airlines B-747 took off
at night in a typhoon on a closed runway in Taiwan and
collided with construction equipment, killing eighty-two
people. 6
Clearly, the above list is not entirely inclusive, but it gives a
clear picture of the catastrophic results that runway incursions
can have for the flying public, the federal aviation authorities,
and aircraft owners and operators.
2. Recognizing A Dangerous Trend
Over the last decade, the reduction of runway incursions has
been a fixture on the National Transportation Safety Board's
(NTSB) "Most Wanted" list of aviation safety improvements. 37
However, over that same time period, runway incursions have
actually increased disproportionately to the increase in airport
operations." Table I shows the statistical rise in runway incur-
sions since the FAA began tracking the data in 1988." 9
35 NTSB, SAFETY ISSUE: RUNWAY INCURSION/GROUND COLLISION OF AIRCRAFr, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/mostwanted/runways.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
36 Associated Press, Crash Details Released: Taiwan Investigators Detail Singapore
Airlines Flight SQO06 Crash (Nov. 7, 2000), at http://www.airdisaster.com/news/
1100/07/news/.sh tml.
37 SAFE'TY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 30, at 2.
38 As used in this article, "airport operations" refers to the total annual number
of take-offs and landings at U.S. airports with operating control towers.
',9 FAA, Runway Incursion Totals By Category: 1988-2000, at http://
www.faarsp.com/ricats88-99.htm; FAA, Runway Incursion Rates with Total Opera-
tions: CY88-CY01, at http:www.faarsp.com/xrirate.html; FAA, Runway Incursion
Totals: CY99-CYOO, at http://www.faarsp.com/daily/xritotOO-99.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2002). The data presented in Table I includes all reported occurrences of
runway incursions, whether collisions or near misses. For a detailed discussion of
the data for calendar year 2000, see infra Part VI.D. As this article went to press,
finalized airport operations data for 2001 was unavailable. For a detailed discus-
sion of the preliminary runway incursion data for 2001, see infra Part VI.E
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TABLE I:
FAA RUNWAY INCURSION DATA - 1988 TO 2000
Total Runway Incursion Rate
Year Runway Incursions Total Airport Operations (per 100,000 operations)
Total PD OED VPD Yearly Total % Change* Rate % Change*
1988 187 68 89 30 62,501,059 - 0.30 -
1989 223 83 80 60 62,625,548 0.2% 0.36 20.0%
1990 281 119 100 62 65,506,291 4.6% 0.43 19.4%
1991 242 102 74 66 62,421,635 -4.7% 0.39 -9.3%
1992 219 92 90 37 63,018,680 1.0% 0.35 -10.3%
1993 186 84 74 28 61,946,482 -1.7% 0.30 -14.3%
1994 200 66 83 51 62,452,572 0.8% 0.32 6.7%
1995 240 125 65 50 62,074,306 -0.6% 0.39 21.9%
1996 275 146 69 60 61,817,425 -0.4% 0.44 12.8%
1997 292 132 87 73 64,440,947 4.2% 0.45 -2.2%
1998 325 183 91 51 66,211,734 2.7% 0.49 8.9%
1999 321 182 78 61 68,672,240 3.7% 0.47 -4.1%
2000 431 259 87 85 67,480,097 -1.7% 0.64 36.2%
* Compared to the previous year.
The critical number in Table I is the Total Runway Incursion
Rate (TRIR). The TRIR is the rate of runway incursions (both
collisions and near-misses) per 100,000 airport operations. A
comparison of FAA data from 1988 to 2000 shows disproportion-
ate yearly changes in TRIR compared with total airport opera-
tions. For example, from 1993 to 2000, the total number of
airport operations increased approximately 9%, while the TRIR
increased over 113%.40 It is also important to note that the total
number of runway incursions increased almost 132% for the
same time period. An analysis by Air Line Pilot Magazine indi-
cated that the risk of runway incursions grows exponentially as a
function of increased airport operations.4 The FAA predicts
40 Data derived from Table I.
41 Lincoln Lounsbury, Why a Little More Traffic Makes a Lot More Runway Incur-
sions, AIR LINE PILOT, May 1999, at 10.
A cursory analysis of the data in Table I shows nearly a 15% increase in runway
incursions for every 1% increase in airport operations based on historical data
from 1993 to 2000. A complex statistical analysis is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, so the relationship between airport operations and runway incursions is as-
sumed to be linear for simplicity. However, there is some evidence that the
number of runway incursions is not proportional to the number of airport opera-
tions. For example, the FAA's historical data shows that the total number of air-
port operations for 1993 and 1996 varied by only 0.2%, while the number of
runway incursions for 1993 and 1996 increased by 48%. In addition, between
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that the total number of airport operations at airports with con-
trol towers will increase as much as 24% between 1999 and
2010.42 If the current trend in runway safety continues, the ex-
pected rise in airport operations in the next decade could lead
to a dramatic rise in runway incursions, with the potential for
more than five runway incursions per day.43 Perhaps the most
dramatic statistic is that the total number of runway incursions
exceeded the total number of reported near mid-air collisions
for each year from 1995 to 1999 44-a clear indication that run-
way incursions pose a serious threat to air travel. In fact, Profes-
sor Arnold Barnett of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
indicated that deaths resulting from runway incursions could
surpass deaths from all other types of aviation accidents com-
bined within the next twenty years unless action is taken to re-
duce runway incursion risk.45 In research conducted under
contract with the FAA, Professor Barnett concluded that approx-
imately 15 fatal runway collisions, resulting in nearly 1,000
deaths and injuries, could occur annually at U.S. airports by
2022.4"
Interestingly, runway incursions do not occur in a uniform
manner across all of the U.S. airports included in the FAA's sta-
tistics (those with control towers). In fact, 18% of all runway
1994 and 1995 the number of total airport operations decreased slightly, while
the number of runway incursions increased 20%.
As a specific example, in 1999 Chicago O'Hare airport had five runway incur-
sions out of 901,761 total operations for a TRIR of 0.56. In comparison, Green
State Airport in Providence, Rhode Island, had five runway incursions out of
156,929 total operations for a TRIR of 3.2. See Nathan A. Ferguson, Crossing the
Line, AOPA PILOT, Oct. 2000, available at http://www.aopa.org/pilot/features/
feat0010.html.
42 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 30, at 2.
43 Assuming a linear relationship between total airport operations and the
number of runway incursions (a 15% increase in runway incursions for every 1%
increase in airport operations), a 24% increase in airport operations from 2000
through 2010 would lead to a 360% increase in runway incursions if current
trends are not reversed. This means that by 2010, there is the possibility that the
United States may experience as many as 1,983 runway incursions annually
(nearly 5.5 per day) during as many as 83,675,320 airport operations for a TRIR
of 2.37.
44 The total number of reported near mid-air collisions for each year is: 238
(1995); 194 (1996); 238 (1997); 208 (1998); and 252 (1999). See SAFETY STATIS-
TICS HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1-1.
45 FAA Certifies ADS-B For Transport jets, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 13, 2000, at 4.
46 News Release, Inst. for Ops. Research & the Mgmt. Sciences, Risk of 700-800
Deaths In U.S. Airport Runway Collisions Over Next 2 Decades, Warn Experts
(Oct. 20, 2000), at http://www.informs.org/Press/SAT03c.htm.
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incursions between 1997 and 2000 occurred at only 2% of the
airports included in FAA statistics.47
3. Underestimating the True Scope of the Danger
It is crucial to remember that the FAA's data only includes
runway incursions occurring at airports with operating control
towers, 48 although an event meeting the FAA's definition of a
runway incursion can occur at any airport no matter how large
or small.49 There are many "uncontrolled" airports in the
United States that do not have control towers. These are usually
small, rural airports with much less traffic than urban facilities
with control towers. The risk of a runway incursion at uncon-
trolled airports poses no less of a threat to the flying public than
at an airport with an operating control tower.
According to a recent FAA report, there were approximately
459 operational control towers in the United States as of 2000,
representing over 180,000 airport operations (take-offs and
landings) per day.5" In contrast, there are over 13,600 airports
in the United States.51 As such, nearly 13,100 airports (96% of
all airports in the U.S.) are excluded from the FAA's runway
incursion statistics. Since FAA statistics only include incursions
at approximately 4% of all U.S. airports, the true scope of the
danger may be grossly underestimated.
Furthermore, according to the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting Sys-
tem (ASRS) data, for every event that meets the FAA's definition
of a runway incursion, three unauthorized runway crossings
("surface incidents") occur that would have been runway incur-
sions had another aircraft, vehicle, person, or object been within
47 The top ten airports with the most runway incursions between 1997 and
2000 are: (1) Los Angeles - 33 incursions; (2) St. Louis - 30 incursions; (3) Or-
ange County, California - 27 incursions; (4) North Las Vegas - 26 incursions; (5)
Long Beach, California - 25 incursions; (6) Dallas-Fort Worth - 23 incursions;
(7) San Francisco - 21 incursions; (8) San Diego/Montgomery Field - 20 incur-
sions; (9) Fort Lauderdale, Florida - 20 incusrions; and (10) Phoenix - 18 incur-
sions. Hearing on Runway Incursions, Focusing on Technology to Prevent Collisions
Before the House Subcomm. on Aviation, 107th Cong. (2001) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/06-26-01/06-26-Ol memo.
html) [hereinafter Technology Testimony].
48 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., supra notes 28 and 33 and accompanying text.
50 See RUNWAY INCURSION SEVERITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 5, 13.
51 Airplane Owners and Pilots Ass'n, U.S. Airports (as of Mar. 24, 2000), at
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/stats/fctcrd07.html.
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the requisite minimum distance allowed between the aircraft
taking-off or landing on the runway.52
Finally, it is worth noting that the FAA's data only includes
those runway incursions that are actually reported. It is highly
likely that many runway incursions go unreported every year be-
cause pilots and air traffic controllers may not realize that a run-
way incursion has occurred. The FAA's efforts to increase
awareness of runway incursion occurrences are discussed later
in this article.53
D. PILOT DEVIATIONS - A SIGNIFICANT DANGER
In the 1990s, Pilot Deviations accounted for nearly 50% of all
runway incursions. 54 By 2000, the contribution of Pilot Devia-
tions was approximately 60%. Runway incursions can involve
all types of aircraft operated by flight crews with varying degrees
of experience. The Inspector General of the Department of
Transportation (DOT/IG) stated that General Aviation (small,
noncommercial aircraft normally operated by pilots with less ex-
perience than air carrier pilots) is responsible for approximately
72% of all runway incursions, while being involved in only 59%
of total airport operations. 5' The DOT/IG noted, however, that
runway incursions that cause actual accidents (collisions)
predominantly involve commercial airline aircraft.5 7 The expla-
nation for this may be found in the nature of general aviation
operations. Most general aviation flights are conducted during
daylight hours in good visibility when the environmental factors
that contribute to collision risk are low. The nature of commer-
cial air carrier operations requires that the pilots fly at night and
in poor visibility58 - factors which can greatly increase the risk of
ground collisions. Furthermore, most general aviation opera-
tions occur at smaller airports where there is less traffic
congestion.
According to the Airplane Owners and Pilots Association
("AOPA"), private pilots (generally, those with the least flight
52 Lounsbury, supra note 41.
53 See infra Part VI.
5" Data derived from Table I, supra Part II.(C).
5 See id.
56 FAA, Runway Incursion Recommendations - RE&D Subcommittee on Run-
way Incursions (Jan. 30, 1998), available at http://faa.gov/aar/red/rep-min/run-
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experience) account for 33% of all Pilot Deviations, while Air-
line Transport Pilots (ATPs-those with the most flight experi-
ence) contribute to 30% of all Pilot Deviations. 59 Furthermore,
pilots with more than 10,000 hours of flight experience are re-
sponsible for 18% of all Pilot Deviations."' Pilots with fewer
than 300 hours of flight experience are involved in 22% of all
Pilot Deviations.6' This makes it clear that pilots of all exper-
iences levels need to be aware of the persistent dangers in air-
craft ground operations.
E. OTHER FACTORS THAT AFFECT RUNWAY SAFETY
In addition to the factors listed above, airport layout, aircraft
design, and potentially dangerous ATC procedures can greatly
increase the chances of a runway incursion.
1. Next Generation Aircraft Design
Current developments in aircraft design could potentially
lead to increased runway incursions with greater risk to passen-
gers and crew. Many aircraft manufacturers are currently devel-
oping ultra-high capacity aircraft. The large size of these
aircraft can lead to more congestion in airport ground opera-
tions and difficulty in maneuvering to avoid obstacles. In addi-
tion, these aircraft are being designed to carry more passengers
than the largest aircraft in service today. In the event of a run-
way incursion, many more lives would be put at risk due to the
high seating capacity." An event such as Tenerife, involving
new, high-capacity airliners, would create an aviation tragedy
not soon forgotten.
2. Airport Planning and Design
The design of an airport can increase the risk of runway incur-
sions. Just as an intersection on a city street is ripe for collisions,
intersections on taxiways and runways at airports are also fre-
59 Airplane Owners and Pilots Ass'n, "Simple Solutions NOW," AOPA President




62 See Rodney Fewings, Ultra-High Capacity Aircraft Will Intensify Airport Safety Is-
sues, AIRPOWr OPERATIONS 21, Jan-Feb 1995, at 1, 3. See also MEAD TESTIMONY,
supra note 9, at 6 (stating that airport design can be a factor in runway
incursions).
61 See Fewings, supra note 62.
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quent locations of runway incursions. Airport lighting and the
distance of the control tower from the runway can also have an
impact on air traffic control's ability to direct aircraft away from
each other.64 Airport safety improvements will be discussed
later in this article.65
3. A Risky ATC Procedure - Playing "Chicken" With Commercial
Airliners
A current ATC procedure has the potential to force a runway
incursion to occur. The procedure, known as Land and Hold
Short Operations (LIASO), essentially takes two aircraft that
are taxiing or landing on intersecting runways and directs them
towards each other.66 In theory, one of the aircraft will stop
short of the intersection (at the direction of ATC) with the
other runway or taxiway and let the other aircraft pass safely.6"
The FAA intends for the LAHSO procedure to increase airport
capacity for take-offs and landings without compromising
safety.68 The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) has endorsed
LAHSO based, in part, on the following guarantees by the FAA:
(1) LAHSO will not be conducted on wet runways since landing
and braking distances are difficult to anticipate; (2) runways
must have appropriate markings and lighting; and (3) LAHSO
is only to be performed by pilots trained in the procedure. 9
Undoubtedly, ATC and pilots will conduct LAHSO in the safest
manner possible to avoid disaster. However, placing aircraft on
a collision course in the hopes that the ATC system, aircraft, and
pilots all perform flawlessly is a dangerous proposition when
data shows that aircraft collide with each other on the ground at
an increasing rate due to errors by ATC and pilots.
64 These concerns were noted as contributing factors in the St. Louis runway
collision. See St. Louis Accident, suprra note 32.
65 See infra Part III.
131 News Release, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, ALPA Issues Statement on LAHSO Concerns
(May 24, 2000), at http://www.alpa.org/internet/news/2000news/nrOO037.htm.
67 See id.
6M See FAA, Land and Hold Short Operations: A Primer, at http://www.faa.gov/avr/
news/lahso.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
69 Duane Woerth, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Our LAHSO Success Belongs to You ...
The ALPA Pilot, at http://www.alpa.org/internet/projects/lahso/cj8dw.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2002).
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III. USING TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE
RUNWAY SAFETY
Human beings are involved in all aspects of airport opera-
tions. Pilots and controllers guide the aircraft through a maze
of concrete ramps, runways, and taxiways on the airport surface.
Ground crew, service personnel, and airport construction work-
ers are also active in the airport environment. With so much
human interaction in the aviation system, human error is a
safety concern that will always be present. This is especially true
in the airport ground environment where people are forced to
work at their various duties on a confined slab of concrete.
Technological solutions to the runway incursion problem fill the
safety gaps caused by the inevitable existence of human error.
A. HIGH-TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS
1. Radar and Satellite Surveillance Systems
The primary technological focus in the effort to reduce run-
way incursions is in the development of radar systems that will
detect aircraft and vehicles on the airport surface. The primary
system is called Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-3).
ASDE-3 is designed to provide radar coverage of aircraft and ve-
hicles on the airport surface at airports with a high density of
surface activity.70 The radar data provided by the ASDE-3 system
is intended to aid controllers in the movement of aircraft and
vehicles on the airport surface when visibility is reduced due to
rain, fog, darkness, and other environmental factors.7 ASDE-3
is currently in use at thirty-three of the nation's busiest
airports. 2
ASDE-X is a lower-cost alternative system similar to ASDE-3,
but intended for airports with a lower level of surface activity
such that the capabilities of ASDE-3 are not required. 3 Cur-
rently, twenty-five airports are scheduled to receive the ASDE-X
system."4 Notably, the Oslo, Norway, airport utilizes a sophisti-
70 FAA, Terminal Surveillance Product Team, at http://www.faa.gov/and/
AND400/and410/410home.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
71 Id.
72 Technology Testimony, supra note 47, at 5.
7- See AIRWise News, FAA Moves to Increase Runway Safety (June 26, 2000), at
http://news.ainvise.com/stories/2000/06/962055318.html. The "low cost"
ASDE-X system is estimated to cost approximately $13 million per unit. Technol-
ogy Testimony, supra note 47, at 7.
74 AIRWise News, supra note 73.
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cated runway surface surveillance radar system which airport of-
ficials claim has virtually eliminated runway incursions.75
A supplemental computer system called the Airport Move-
ment Area Safety System (AMASS) works with ASDE-3 and
ASDE-X to provide air and ground traffic controllers with visual
and aural warnings of impending surface collisions.7 6 However,
the effectiveness of the AMASS system has come in question af-
ter a runway incursion at Chicago O'Hare airport in 1999 where
two 747 jumbo jets nearly collided.77 The AMASS system was
not operational at O'Hare at the time of the incursion, but a
computer analysis by the FAA showed that AMASS would only
have given traffic controllers a six-second advanced warning of
the impending collision - not nearly enough time to warn and
stop two jumbo jets. 78 Still, the FAA plans to have AMASS sys-
tems installed at airports equipped with ASDE-3 by late 2002. T"
However, that target date may be difficult to achieve as both the
ASDE-3 and AMASS programs have a history of cost overruns
and schedule delays."'
A system similar to ASDE is called Automatic Dependent Sur-
veillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). The ADS-B system transmits and
receives signals via satellite."' A Global Positioning System
(GPS) then locates the position of the signal and provides that
positioning data to computers, which can generate a display of
the target's position on the airport surface. 2 The United Parcel
Service (UPS) recently announced plans to install ADS-B sys-
tems in 230 of its cargo aircraft." Various cockpit displays, in-
cluding Heads-Up Displays (HUDs), are being developed to
display the data provided by the ADS-B system to the pilots of
aircraft equipped to receive the information. 4 These display
75 "Simple Things" Needed to Prevent Near Misses at Airports, AIR SAFETY WEEK, June
19, 2000, at 3.
76 AIRWise News, supra note 73. It is interesting to note that only six of the ten
airports with the most runway incursions (supra note 47) are scheduled to receive
either AMASS or ASDE-X. See also Technology Testimony, supra note 47, at 4.
v7 See Ferguson, supra note 41. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
78 See Ferguson, supra note 41.
79 AIRWise News, supra note 73.
80 See infra Part V. (C).
81 James Ott, ADS-B Stirs FAA Certification Plans, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Nov. 6, 2000, at 45.
82 Id.
83 FAA Certifies ADS-B For Transport jets, supra note 45.
84 Paul Proctor, New Heads-Up Tool Aims to Cut Runway Incidents, AVIATION WEEK
& SPACE TECH., Aug. 14, 2000, at 48-50.
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systems allow pilots to "see" collision threats without having to
rely on warnings from controllers.
2. Loop Technology Surveillance Systems
"Loop" technology (LOT) is currently used at many automo-
bile traffic intersections around the world. The airport version
of the LOT system consists of electrically inductive coils buried
in the runway or taxiway.85 The buried coils set up an electrical
field that is cut by the metallic structure of an aircraft or vehicle
as it passes over the loop. 6 This creates an electrical current in
the loop that is a function of the size of the metallic object pass-
ing over the loop and the height of that object above the con-
crete surface.87 A computer system can then analyze the
electrical current created by the passing vehicle or aircraft and
inform the air and ground controllers not only of the presence
of the object on the airport surface, but also of the size or type
of object (for example, a Boeing 747 aircraft versus a fuel
truck).88 The LOT system has the ability to monitor a small sec-
tion of the airport and, as such, is a possible alternative for air-
ports that do not have the heavy ground traffic density that
would require ASDE-3 or ASDE-X systems.89 The United States
Air Force has partnered with a private engineering company to
develop a LOT system called the Ground Safety Tracking and
Reporting System (GSTARS). ° The Munich, Germany, airport
utilizes LOT technology which airport officials claim has virtu-
ally eliminated runway incursions.91
B. Low-TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS
In addition to expensive high-technology devices, simple, low
technology efforts may aid in reducing runway incursions.
1. Airport Lighting
Runways and taxiways are lighted in different colors so that
pilots are able to distinguish between surfaces. The FAA has de-
85 Vern Edwards and Carl Evers, Loop Technology (LOT) as an Alternative Surface
Surveillance System, AIAA 17th Annual Digital Avionics Systems Conference
(1998), available at http://www.rannoch.com/PDF/LOT.pdf.
86 Id. at 1.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 3.
89 Id. at 1.
90 Program Enhances Airport Ground Safety, R & D MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 2000, at I.
9 1 "Simple Things" Needed to Prevent Near Misses at Airports, supra note 75, at 3.
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veloped Runway Safety Lights (RWSL), also called "stop bar"
lights, as an added safety feature in an effort to prevent runway
incursions. 92 The RWSL system comprises a set of radar-based,
automated runway status lights that illuminate in red when it is
unsafe for an aircraft to enter a runway or proceed with a take-
off due to interfering aircraft or vehicle traffic. 3 These lights
would be used in addition to other runway and taxiway lights
that denote the boundaries and centerlines of the runway and
taxiway surfaces. London's Heathrow airport uses a "stop bar"
light system and airport officials claim that runway incursions
rarely occur. 4
Another type of airport lighting system involves using laser
light to project stopping lines on the surface of runways or taxi-
ways. The FAA has entered into a research and development
agreement with an Alaskan company to further develop the la-
ser light system.96
2. Airport Signage and Markings
Airport signs use a color convention to convey important in-
formation to pilots and ground vehicle operators. A red sign
with white letters indicates that an aircraft is approaching a run-
way.97 A black sign with a yellow frame and yellow letters indi-
cates the name of a taxiway or runway that the aircraft or vehicle
is currently operating on.98 Yellow signs with black letters are
used to provide directions to aircraft and ground vehicles on
how to proceed to a desired location on the airport surface. 9
Increasing the prominence of airport signage could aid in de-
creasing runway incursions by enhancing the situational aware-
ness of both pilots and vehicle operators.
A current FAA runway safety initiative calls for the improve-
ment of runway surface markings.""0 The yellow "hold lines,"
92 FAA, Runway Status Lights, at http://www.faa.gov/and/and4OO/and410/
rwsl/rvsll.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
'0: IdJ.
,14 "Simple Things" Needed to Prevent Near Misses at Airports, supra note 75, at 3.
95 See Greatland Laser Lighting Systems, at http://v.greatlandlaser.com/
airport.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
"' See id.
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which show a pilot where to stop when approaching a runway
intersection, are to be increased in size from a six-inch width to
a twelve-inch width to increase visibility to pilots and vehicle
operators. 101
Another type of surface marking involves the use of "rumble
strips" embedded in the runway or taxiway surface, similar to
those used on automobile roadways." 2 This device is intended
to warn a pilot that the aircraft is approaching the entrance to a
runway.'0 3 However, rumble strips have limited effectiveness.
This is due to the fact that that a fixed-size rumble strip would
have a different effect on different size aircraft or vehicles. For
example, a rumble strip designed to warn the flight crew of a
747 would have to be so large that it could do serious damage to
small, private aircraft. 10 4
3. Airport Design
As discussed above, the design of the airport surface can lead
to an increased risk of runway incursions.0 5 Three recent run-
way incursions at New York's LaGuardia airport clearly demon-
strate that runway design can increase the risk of runway
incursions. All three incidents involved large commercial pas-
senger aircraft passing close to each other at the intersection
point of two runways. 106 Clearly, airport designs that minimize
runway intersections can aid in the reduction of the potential
for runway incursions. The Oslo, Norway and Munich, Germany
airports were designed to minimize the amount of traffic cross-
ing the runways." 7 Furthermore, both of these airports are de-
signed such that maintenance roads circumvent runways.108
101 Id.
102 Ferguson, supra note 41.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See supra Part II.(E).
106 See Frances Fiorino, Runway Mix a Factor in LaGuardia Incidents, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 26, 2000, at 72.
107 "Simple Things" Needed to Prevent Near Misses at Airports, supra note 75, at 3.
The Oslo and the Munich airports have parallel runways with almost all ramps
and taxiways located between the runways so that nearly all taxi routes avoid
crossing the runways. See Methods of Preventing Runway Collisions Evolve in Europe
and the United States, AIRPORT OPERATIONS 26, July - Aug. 2000, at 4 (hereinafter
Methods of Preventing Runway Collisions).
108 Methods of Preventing Runway Collisions, supra note 107, at 4.
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Officials at these European airports indicate that runway incur-
sions are minimal. 10 9
Low-technology solutions have provided a significant reduc-
tion in runway incursions at the Cleveland Hopkins Interna-
tional Airport in Ohio. Cleveland Hopkins once had the
highest number of runway incursions in the country."' In an
effort to reduce the number of runway incursions, the airport
painted wider "hold" lines, installed improved runway and taxi-
way lighting, installed "stop bar" lights at the entrance to one
runway, closed a confusing taxiway, and color-coded taxiway
routes for pilots.' Between October 1999 and October 2000,
Cleveland Hopkins airport had only one runway incursion, com-
pared with nineteen incursions in 1996' 12 - a clear example that
low-tech solutions can be effective at reducing the number of
runway incursions.
IV. REDUCING HUMAN ERROR
Technological solutions to runway incursions are slow to de-
velop and can be costly to implement. A quicker, less expensive
parallel solution must be found to reduce the number of runway
incursions at U.S. airports. As such, the FAA has determined
that reducing human error in controllers, pilots, and airport ve-
hicle operators is critical to reducing runway incursions.
Human error will always be present in aviation, but reducing the
occurrence of human error will go a long way to improving run-
way safety.
A. REDUCING CONTROLLER ERROR
The FAA recognizes Operational Errors and Deviations as
contributing factors to runway incursions. As stated previously,
controller errors account for approximately one-third of all run-
way incursions.' I' In times of low visibility, when the risk of run-
way incursions is particularly high, pilots must rely on air and
ground traffic controllers to guide aircraft around the airport
surface. Controllers are capable of making mistakes even with
access to the best traffic control technology. It is imperative to
I og Id.
'0 Ferguson, supra note 41.
I[I 1d.
112 J&
113 See supra Part II.B.
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reduce controller mistakes in order to reduce runway
incursions.
The FAA's newest safety initiatives focusing on reducing con-
troller error are discussed later in this article." 4 The current
commitment to reducing controller error focuses on education
and training and improving a controller's situational aware-
ness. 11 5 Training courses and materials can educate a controller
on the efficient movement of airport ground and air traffic.
Controllers work in a fast-paced, high stress environment. They
must operate at peak mental efficiency to effectively and safely
move aircraft and vehicles on the airport surface. A recent study
conducted by the Flight Safety Foundation found that air traffic
controllers who took short naps during simulated work shifts
displayed greater mental alertness.116 Improved training and in-
creased mental alertness are imperative to reducing controller
mistakes.
B. REDUCING VEHICLE OPERATOR AND PEDESTRIAN ERROR
Pedestrian and Vehicle Operator Deviations account for ap-
proximately one-fifth of all runway incursions. 1 7 Once again,
the FAA has recognized that increased training, education, and
situational awareness are imperative to reducing these errors."'1
Airport vehicle drivers have access to booklets, pamphlets, and
training videos that educate on the safe operation of vehicles in
an airport environment."'
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs) for Aeronautics and
Space specifically states that airport operators must establish and
implement procedures for the operation of vehicles on the air-
port surface. 2 ° Airfield driver training is not specifically re-
quired by the FARs, but most airports now provide some form of
driver training for people who require vehicle access to the air-
port surface area. 12' As with controllers and pilots, situational
114 See infra Part VI.
115 See id.
116 Frances Fiorino, How Can U.S. Reduce Runway Incursions?, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., June 26, 2000, at 67.
1'7 See supra Part II.(B).
118 See infra Part VI.
I Airfield Driver Training, Enforcement Help Prevent Aircraft Vehicle Collisions, AIR-
PORT OPERATIONS 26, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 2 [hereinafter Airfield Driver Training].
120 14 C.F.R. § 139.329(b) (2000).
121 Airfield Driver Training, supra note 119, at 2-3.
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awareness in the airport environment is crucial to the reduction
of vehicle operator errors.
C. REDUCING PILOT ERROR
From 1988 to the late 1990s, Pilot Deviations accounted for
nearly half of all runway incursions at U.S. airports. 122 In recent
years, Pilot Deviations have risen to account for as many as 60%
of all runway incursions. 23 As such, reducing pilot error is per-
haps the most critical factor in reducing runway incursions. The
FAA's newest safety initiatives focusing on reducing pilot error
are discussed later in this article. 124 The current commitment to
reducing pilot error focuses on pilot education and training as
well as improving a pilot's awareness of the airport situation and
the pilot's communication with controllers. 125
In addition to training and education programs offered by
the FAA and other aviation authorities, pilots can prevent run-
way incursions by following simple tenets of safe operation on
the airport surface: 126
* Review airport diagrams to become familiar with runway
and taxiway orientation.
* Know and understand airport signage and lighting.
" After receiving controller instructions to "cross" or "hold-
short" of runways or taxiways, read back those instructions
to the controllers to confirm a correct understanding. 21
* Review the Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) for the specific
airport to obtain information on runway and taxiway clo-
sures or construction areas.
* When unsure of the route of taxi, contact the controller
and request progressive taxi instructions.
* Check for aircraft and vehicle traffic prior to crossing or
entering any taxiway or runway.
122 See supra Part II.(B).
123 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
124 See infra Part VI.
125 See id.
126 H. Dean Chamberlain, Runway Incursion Is No Accident, FAA AVIATION NEWS,
Feb. 2000, at 2.
127 As part of the FAA's Runway Safety Program, many regional workshops
were conducted to educate pilots and controllers. As a part of these workshops,
recommendations were issued which included revising 14 C.F.R. § 91.129(i) to
require pilots to obtain controller clearance prior to crossing any runway. See
FAA, National Runway Safety Summit, at http://www.faarsp.com/sum-
mitmain.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002). See also 14 C.F.R. § 91.129(i) (2000).
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* Turn on aircraft lights while taxiing to provide greater visi-
bility to controllers, vehicle operators, and other pilots.
* After landing, clear the runway as soon as feasible and
then contact the controller for taxi instructions prior to
any movement on the taxiway.
* Use and understand the proper aviation terminology and
phraseology when communicating with controllers.
V. THE FAA'S FAILED ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT
RUNWAY INCURSIONS
A. THE 1980s - INITIAL ATTEMPTS To IMPROVE SAFETY
FALL SHORT
As a result of several ground collisions and near misses in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the NTSB began a special investiga-
tion in 1985 to determine ways to reduce runway incursions.
28
In 1986, the NTSB issued a report entitled "Runway Incursions
at Controlled Airports in the United States" (1986 Report)
which discussed thirty-three safety recommendations aimed at
reducing runway incursions. 129 Of those recommendations,
nineteen had been issued prior to the 1986 Report and fourteen
were added by the 1986 Report.""'
The 1986 Report was critical of the FAA's past efforts to re-
duce runway incursions. 131 The NTSB found that the FAA had
taken "unacceptable action" on seven of the nineteen existing
recommendations.'3 2 Specifically, the 1986 Report noted that
the FAA was unable to provide measurable data regarding run-
way incursions due to incomplete reporting of events and poor
follow-up investigations. 33 The 1986 Report also stated that
FAA tower controllers were not adequately trained to prepare
them for the rigors of working in a control tower.' The NTSB
also noted that the FAA did not have "standard evaluation and
re-training procedures for controllers involved in operational
errors."135
128 1986 NTSB REPORT, supra note 27.
129 Id. at 36-42.
130 id.
131 Id. at 33.
132 Id. at 36-42.
133 1986 NTSB REPORT, supra note 27, at 33.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 35.
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B. 1990 TO 1995 - FAA DEVELOPS RUNWAY INCURSION PLANS
At the time of the 1990 runway collision in Atlanta, 136 the FAA
had still not implemented many of the safety recommendations
from the 1986 Report. Consequently, the NTSB included run-
way incursions on its "Most Wanted" list of transportation safety
improvements. 3 7
In 1991, the FAA developed a Runway Incursion Plan (1991
Plan) that included forty-five action items to be implemented in
order to reduce runway incursions.1 38 The 1991 Plan created a
focal point within the FAA for coordination of the Plan between
the various organizations that would be involved in the runway
incursion program. 139 In 1995, the FAA revised the 1991 Plan
and released a new Runway Incursion Action Plan (1995 Plan)
with the goal of reducing the number of runway incursions to
forty-one (an 85% reduction from the 287 runway incursions
that occurred in 1996) by the end of 2000.10 The 1995 Plan
contained an extensive list of projects affecting the national avia-
tion system. The projects ranged from the improvement of traf-
fic control procedures, to the improved lighting at airports, to
the purchase of advanced technologies (such as ground radar)
to aid air traffic controllers in avoiding runway incursions.14 '
Two of the technological enhancements that the FAA specifi-
cally discussed were the ASDE-3 radar system and AMASS. 14 2
C. 1997 - FAA's 1995 RUNWAY INCURSION PLAN
FOUND INEFFECTIVE
Through 1997, Congress had appropriated nearly $309 mil-
lion for runway incursion projects. 4 3 Despite the large govern-
ment financial support, the FAA's Runway Incursion Program
was making little progress. On November 13, 1997, Jim Hall,
the Chairman of the NTSB, presented a critical assessment of
the FAA's actions to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee on Aviation.'44 Mr. Hall stated that in 1995 the NTSB
131 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 30, at 1.
137 Id.
1 Mead Statement, supra note 9, at 5-6.
1-) id. at 6.
140 Id. at 1, 5.
I'll Id. at 6.
142 Id.
'43 DOT, REPORT No. AV-1988-017, AUDIT REPORT: RUNWAY INCURSION PRO-
GRAM 2 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 AUDIT].
14 See Hall Testimony, supra note 26.
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issued safety recommendations that urged the FAA to form a
task force to implement the recommendations to improve run-
way safety. 14 5 As part of his critique, Mr. Hall pointed out:
[I] t was not until October [1997] that a roundtable discussion of
the runway incursion problem was conducted. While it appears
that the FAA is willing to acknowledge that there is a problem
with [airport] surface operations, there does not appear to be
the appropriate level of emphasis given in this area.146
At the same House Subcommittee meeting, Kenneth Mead,
the DOT/IG, presented a critical assessment of the FAA's 1995
Plan. 147 Early in 1998, the DOT/IG issued an Audit Report
(1998 Audit) of the FAA's Runway Incursion Program that reit-
erated the content of the DOT/IG's congressional testimony. 48
The DOT/IG found that the plan was not working as designed
due to a variety of causes. 49 First, the DOT/IG determined that
the FAA team charged with implementing and coordinating the
projects listed in the 1995 Plan was never formed and no docu-
mentation was ever produced updating the status of the plan. 5 "
The DOT/IG was particularly troubled by the fact that FAA
headquarters had not discussed the 1995 Plan with its regional
offices, as those offices had little knowledge of the Plan's exis-
tence.' 5 ' Second, the DOT/IG found that runway incursion re-
duction programs instituted by local aviation authorities at some
airports were not disclosed to the national director of the FAA's
Runway Incursion Program. 152 Third, the DOT/IG determined
that the 1995 Plan targeted the wrong problems areas for im-
provement. As mentioned above, the majority of runway incur-
sions are caused by Pilot Deviations. 153 However, the DOT/IG
noted that the 1995 Plan did not include programs that were
directed at reducing the number of Pilot Deviations. 154
In addition, the DOT/IG found that the FAA's runway incur-
sion data was not accurate because: (1) not all runway incur-
sions were reported; (2) some runway incursions were not
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Mead Statement, supra note 9.
148 1998 AUDIT, supra note 143.
149 Id. at 5-19.
150 Id. at 8.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 9.
153 See supra Part II.(D).
154 1998 AUDIT, supra note 143, at 9.
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reported properly; and (3) some runway incursion reports were
not validated, including fourteen reports that were more than
three years overdue. 155 Finally, the DOT/IG noted that the de-
velopment and installation of the FAA's new technology
(AMASS and ASDE-3) was significantly behind schedule.156 Spe-
cifically, the DOT/IG noted that both ASDE-3 and AMASS were
four years behind schedule and AMASS was $14.3 million over
budget. 5 17 The DOT/IG also noted that it would be unlikely for
the FAA to reach its goal of only forty-one runway incursions by
the end of 2000 if the Runway Incursion Program was not im-
proved.158 The DOT/IG made eight recommendations to im-
prove the Runway Incursion Program, including: (1) improve
FAA coordination of local, regional, and national runway incur-
sion reduction efforts; (2) increase the focus on reducing Pilot
Deviations and improving pilot education of runway incursion
prevention measures; and (3) improve data collection and anal-
ysis. 159 Late in 1997, the FAA agreed to implement all eight rec-
ommendations by the end of 1998.160 Despite the poor results
of the previous Runway Incursion Plans, Congress designated
$21.8 million for runway incursion programs in Fiscal Year
1998.161
D. 1998 - FAA INTRODUCES "AIRPORT SURFACE OPERATIONS
SAFETY ACTION PLAN"
As a result of the DOT/IG's critical assessment of the FAA's
efforts to reduce runway incursions, the FAA's Research, Engi-
neering, and Development Advisory Committee endorsed the
DOT/IG's recommendations for improvement and added its
own recommendations. 6 2 The result was the development of
the FAA's 1998 Airport Surface Operations Safety Action Plan
155 Id. at 14.
156 Id. at 15.
157 Id. By May 29, 2001, the date when the FAA officially approved the AMASS
system for installation at U.S airports, the AMASS program was six years behind
schedule and approximately 154% over budget. See Technoloy Testimony, supra
note 47, at 6.
158 MEAD STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 1.
159 1998 AUDIT, supra note 143, at 20.
160 Id. at App.
16, Id. at 2.
162 RE&D Subcommittee Recommendations, supra note 56.
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(1998 Plan).' 6 3 The primary goal of the 1998 Plan was to reduce
the number of runway incursions to 248 (a 15% reduction from
the 1997 level) by the year 2000.164 However, recall that the
FAA's goal in 1997 was to reduce the number of runway incur-
sions to forty-one by the year 2000.165 This adjustment repre-
sented a 600% retreat from the FAA's 1997 safety goals.
The 1998 Plan was designed to provide a "highly focused cen-
tral management team structure and a system-wide approach to
accomplishing the Plan's goals and objectives."' 66 The 1998
Plan introduced five objectives that the FAA believed would lead
to a reduction in runway incursions: (1) improved planning,
data collection/analysis, and program management; (2) im-
proved pilot/controller communications and pilot/crew train-
ing; (3) provide traffic controllers with improved tools,
techniques, and capabilities for managing airport surface traffic;
(4) improved airport surface facilities, design, and operation;
and (5) improved awareness in the aviation community of run-
way incursion risk.167
The FAA set-up an organizational structure designed to im-
prove the efficiency of the Runway Incursion Program. At the
top of the organization was the Runway Incursion Program Of-
fice that provided "direction, guidance, and oversight" for the
various projects aimed at reducing runway incursions.'68 Fur-
thermore, a Runway Incursion Leadership Team was formed
whose membership included representatives from various FAA
divisions involved in the Runway Incursion Program.'69 Finally,
the 1998 Plan included a provision for the development of a
Program Implementation Plan (PIP) that would be used to pri-
oritize and evaluate the progress of the various initiatives the
FAA would pursue. 70
163 FAA, 1998 AIRPORT SURFACE OPERATIONS SAFETY ACTION PLAN TO PREVENT
RUNWAY INCURSIONS AND IMPROVE OPERATIONS (1998) [hereinafter 1998 SAFETY
ACTION PLAN].
164 Id. at 1.
165 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
166 1998 SAFETY ACTION PLAN, supra note 163, at 1.
167 Id. at 2, 12-25.
168 Id. at 4.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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E. 1999 - FAA's 1998 SAFETY ACTION PLAN
FOUND INEFFECTIVE
On February 4, 1999, John O'Brien, the Director of the Engi-
neering and Air Safety Department of the ALPA testified before
the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Aviation on the
FAA's failure to enhance runway safety. 171 O'Brien expressed
concern that the FAA was not meeting certain congressional di-
rectives to improve aviation safety. 172 In particular, Mr. O'Brien
indicated that the FAA failed to follow the direction of 49 U.S.C.
§ 47101 (f), which lists numerous aviation safety items that are to
be "maximally implemented."' 17' Four of the specified safety
items enumerated in this statute pertain to runway safety. 174
Two of the safety items, an airport surface movement radar sys-
tem and a taxiway lighting and sign system, had been required
by statute since 1987.171
On July 21, 1999, the DOT/IG issued another Audit Report
(1999 Audit) reviewing the FAA's Runway Incursion Program. 176
The opening sentence of the 1999 Audit's "Results-In Brief' sec-
tion sets the tone: "[The] FAA's Runway Safety Program contin-
ues to be ineffective in reducing runway incursions."' 177 The
report also emphasized that "[pirogress to reduce runway incursions
has not been made."'178 The DOT/IG noted that the number of
runway incursions continued to rise during 1998 to the highest
level since the FAA began tracking runway incursion data.179 In
addition, Pilot Deviations reached record levels and accounted
for 56% of all runway incursions.8" The 1999 Audit went on to
discuss the severity of runway incursions that had occurred in
the first six months of 1999 by citing two runway incursions (one
171 Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration and the Airport Improve-
ment Program: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Aviation, 106th Cong. 54-474CC
(1999) (statement of John O'Brien).
172 /d.
'73 Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 47101(f) (2000).
174 Id. § 47101 (f) (7),(8),(9),(10).
175 Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-223, 101 Stat. 1486, at § 102(a) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. app.
2201).
176 DOT, REPORT No. AV-1999-114, AUDIr REPORT: FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF
FAA's RUNWAY SAFETY PROGRAM (1999) [hereinafter 1999 AUDIT].
177 Id. at ii.
178 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
179 Id. at ii. In 1998, runway incursions reached record levels with 325 occur-
rences. See Table I, supra Part 11.(C).
's0 1999 AUDIT, supra note 176, at ii. See also Table I, supra Part I(C).
574
2002] THE INCREASING RISK OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS 575
at O'Hare airport in Chicago and one at JFK airport in New
York) in which large passenger jets on take-off narrowly missed
other passenger jets that had entered the runway."'
The 1999 Audit indicated that none of the initiatives from the
1998 Plan directed at pilot training, education, and awareness
had been implemented, while nearly 50% of the technology-
based initiatives had been implemented.1'12 This occurred de-
spite the fact that DOT data indicate that the majority of all run-
way incursions are caused by Pilot Deviations. 8 ' Therefore,
increased pilot training, education, and awareness should be the
obvious targets for immediate improvement in runway incursion
reduction.
In fact, the DOT/IG specifically noted that 65% of the short-
term goals discussed in the 1998 Plan had not been imple-
mented. 84 The 1999 Audit also noted that the AMASS system
was continuing to experience schedule delays and cost over-
runs.8 5 The 1999 Audit presented six recommendations for im-
provement to the Runway Incursion Program, including: (1) the
need for the FAA to establish a central management structure to
ensure that the 1998 Plan initiatives are executed; (2) the need
for the FAA to revise the AMASS development schedule and re-
quest additional program funding; and (3) the need for the
FAA to determine funding requirements for the implementa-
tion of 1998 Plan initiatives in 2001 and beyond.'86 The FAA
concurred with the recommendations and agreed to take cor-
rective action.8 7 However, the DOT/IG was not satisfied with
the FAA's response to the recommendation for determination
of program funding requirements for 2001 and beyond. The
DOT/IG specifically noted that the FAA's response was "un-
clear" as to how the FAA would determine its funding require-
ments for the overall operating budget of the 1998 Plan.'88
181 1999 AUDIT, supra note 176, at iii. For a discussion of these runway incur-
sion incidents, see supra Part I.(C).
182 1999 AUDIT, supra note 176, at v.
183 See supra Part 1I.(D).
184 1999 AUDIT, supra note 176, at iv.
185 Id. at vi-vii.
186 Id. at viii-ix.
187 Id. at ix.
188 Id. at x.
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VI. RUNWAY SAFETY IN THE NEW MILLENIUM
A. THE FAA's RUNWAY INCURSION PROGRAM iS REBORN
In October 1999, the FAA announced a "make-over" of the
Runway Incursion Program in the form of a new Runway Safety
Program (RSP). '19 The mission of RSP is to reduce the number
of runway incursions and incidents. 19' The RSP defined three
broad goals in its effort to improve runway safety: (1) decrease
the number of ATC Operational Errors and Deviations; (2) in-
crease individual airport efforts on reducing the number of Ve-
hicle and Pedestrian Deviations; and (3) increasing the
standards for investigating and analyzing Pilot Deviations. 1'"
In furtherance of its renewed efforts to increase runway safety,
the FAA appears to be focusing more directly on the primary
cause of runway incursions - Pilot Deviations. Since the begin-
ning of 2000, the FAA has conducted over 600 safety seminars
for pilots to educate them on safe airport ground operations. 9'
In addition, the FAA has announced new runway safety initia-
tives, established a Runway Incursion Information and Evalua-
tion Program for better data gathering, and conducted a major
"runway safety summit" inJune 2000 at the urging of U.S. House
of Representatives member Frank Wolf.'9 3 More than 500 avia-
tion safety experts attended the three-day event.'94
However, in a decision that contradicts the efforts to reduce
runway incursions, the FAA failed to renew a contract with the
National Association of State Aviation Officials (NASAO) for
runway safety inspections at smaller airports. 115 This program
had been in place for ten years and provided for safety surveys
of nearly 5,000 runways every three years. 196 The runway infor-
mation provided by the NASAO had been used to provide de-
tailed runway charts to pilots.'9 7 Interestingly, the NASAO only
189 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 30, at 9.
190 See NTSB Press Release, supra note 34.
191 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 30, at 9.
192 Id.
193 Id. See also Cable News Network, supra note 34.
194 Amy Higgins, Chance of Accidents Escalating: Cincinnati Has Good Record, De-
spite a Scare, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (June 26, 2000), available at http://archives.
californiaaviation.org/airport/msg09089.html.
195 The failure to renew the runway inspection program was due to the FAA's
desire to reduce its operating budget. NASA0 Officials Upset Over Lapse of Airport
Inspection Program, WEEKLY OF Bus. AvIATION, Oct. 9, 2000, at 160.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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charged the FAA $325 per inspection, for a total cost of approxi-
mately $1.625 million for the inspection of 5,000 runways every
three years - equivalent to a yearly program cost of only
$542,000.19' Under the FAA's new runway inspection program,
state aviation authorities will have to apply for reimbursement
from the FAA for the cost of inspections the state agencies con-
duct.'99 According to Steve Ogrodzinski, president of the
NASAO, the FAA's new runway inspection plan will create "con-
siderable" paperwork for state aviation authorities and result in
the elimination of an "efficient [safety] program. '"200
B. NEAR-TERM SAFETY INITIATIVES
As a result of the information gathered during the safety sum-
mit in June 2000, the FAA reviewed several-hundred safety rec-
ommendations.201 The FAA selected ten near-term initiatives
that it determined were most likely to reduce runway incur-
sions.2 2 The ten initiatives were selected using the following cri-
teria: (1) each initiative could be implemented within thirty
days; (2) each initiative could be completed by the end of the
year 2000; and (3) each initiative had a high potential for reduc-
ing runway incursions.20 3 On August 1, 2000, the FAA released a
report entitled "Ten Initiatives for Reducing Runway Incur-
sions," in which the following near-term initiatives were
discussed: 2°4
1. Initiative #1: Enhance Operational Tower Controller Training
Training will be provided to aid controllers in maintaining sit-
uational awareness and prioritizing aircraft movements so as to
maintain adequate separation between aircraft.20 5
2. Initiative #2: Foreign Air Carrier Pilot Training, Education, and
Awareness
Training will be designed to educate pilots of foreign airlines
on the prevention of runway incursions at U.S. airports.20 6
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 NASAO Officials, supra note 195.




205 Id. at 5-6.
206 NEAR TERM INITIATIVES, supra note 100, at 7.
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3. Initiative #3: Advisory Circular for Airport Surface Operations
An advisory bulletin will be published that itemizes the "best
practices" for airport ground operations that will include guide-
lines for the implementation of standard pilot procedures for
safe airport ground operations. 207
4. Initiative #4: Improved Runway Markings
Runway markings, particularly the yellow "hold line," which
shows a pilot where to stop when approaching a runway intersec-
tion, will be increased in size (from 6-inch width to 12-inch
width) and outlined in black paint to improve visibility. 28
5. Initiative #5: Education and Training for Pilots, Controllers,
and Vehicle Operators
Educational and training materials will be provided to aircraft
pilots, ATC personnel, and airport ground vehicle operators to
aid in their awareness and avoidance of runway incursion risks.
The effectiveness of this effort will be tracked and training
materials will be updated as required.20 9
6. Initiative #6: Memory Enhancement Techniques Training for
Tower Controllers
Training will be provided to tower controllers to teach mem-
ory aids to assist controllers in remembering locations of aircraft
and vehicles in the airport operations area. Training will be fo-
cused on enhancing memory techniques under unusual and ad-
verse operating conditions such as abnormally high aircraft
operations volume or adverse weather. 10
7. Initiative #7: Pilot/Controller Communications Phraseology
Review
Communications procedures between pilots and controllers
will be revised to reduce confusion and ease workloads. This
initiative will likely include the requirement that pilots repeat all
controller requests to "hold-short" of an active runway or
taxiway.2 11
207 Id. at 8-9.
208 Id. at 10-11.
209 Id. at 12-15.
210 Id. at 16-17.
21, NEAR TERM INIFATIrVES, supra note 100, at 18-19.
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8. Initiative #8: Improved Pilot Evaluation and Testing
All pilot check flights will evaluate the pilot's ability to safely
operate on the airport surface. The testing will include knowl-
edge of airport signs, markings, lighting, and communica-
tions.2 1 2
9. Initiative #9: Air Traffic Teamwork Enhancement Training for
Tower Controllers
Controller teamwork training will be conducted at ten air-
ports with the highest number of runway incursions caused by
Operational Errors.213
10. Initiative #10: Technology Assessment
A technical evaluation team will be formed to determine
which technologies have the greatest potential to reduce runway
incursions. The team will evaluate and select which technolo-
gies will be implemented at airport facilities.214
C. LONG-TERM SAFETY INITIATIVES
In October 2000, the FAA issued the "National Blueprint for
Runway Safety" (Blueprint) .215 This document is intended to
provide guidelines by which the FAA, and the aviation commu-
nity as a whole, will work to reduce runway incursions and
achieve a safer runway environment. 216 The Blueprint contains
a discussion of the history of the runway incursion problem and
a brief discussion of the FAA's past safety initiatives.21 7
The organization and management of the FAA's runway in-
cursion effort has changed drastically since the FAA began seri-
ous monitoring of the problem starting in 1988. The Blueprint
discusses the current management structure of the RSP.21 8 In
essence, the RSP program office is the focal point for all runway
incursion activity. The RSP program office coordinates the ef-
forts of the FAA, the aviation community (including commercial
airlines and pilot groups), manufacturers of the technology
212 Id. at 20-21.
213 Id. at 22.
214 Id. at 23.
215 FAA, NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR RUNWAY SAFETY (2000) [hereinafter 2000
BLUEPRINT].
216 Id. at v.
217 Id. at 3-21.
218 See id. at Part IV.
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used to enhance runway safety, the media, academia, and other
national and international governmental organizations.2"' Re-
gional RSP managers direct regional activities to reduce runway
incursions and report their activity to the national RSP
manager.22 °
However, the core of the Blueprint is found in the discussion
of the safety initiatives that the RSP has defined to improve run-
way safety. The RSP has organized the initiatives into seven
categories.
1. Training Initiatives
The safety initiatives in the Training category are designed to
improve the performance, knowledge, and skill of pilots, air traf-
fic controllers, and all other personnel who operate in the air-
port environment.22' The Blueprint specifically lists seventeen
training initiatives that the RSP believes are imperative to en-
hancing runway safety. Among these initiatives are plans to de-
velop testing standards for pilots to determine if more training
is required to prepare the pilots for operation on the airport
surface, development of training courses for air traffic control-
lers to aid them in maintaining situational awareness of the air-
port environment, distribution of pilot training materials
focused on runway incursion prevention, and development of
Runway Construction Safety Plans which would train airport
construction crews in the safe operation of equipment in the
airport surface environment.222
In addition to the training initiatives, the Blueprint specifi-
cally states that the RSP intends to develop a "culture" that em-
phasizes runway safety and cooperation among airline
operators, such as sharing of data and review of air carrier pro-
cedures that may hinder safety. 223 This element is important be-
cause it indicates that the FAA intends to hold accountable the
various parties involved in airport surface operations, and it
shows that runway safety can only be improved by a combined
effort of the entire aviation community.
219 Id. at 23.
22!0 2000 BLUEPRINT, supra note 215, at 22.
22! Id. at 12.
222 Id. at 12-15. Construction equipment on the airport surface can pose a
serious risk of a runway incursion. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
223 2000 BLUEPRINT, supra note 215, at 15.
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2. Technology Initiatives
The Technology Initiatives are intended to supplement the
training initiatives discussed above, as well as fill the safety void
created by the ever-present factor of human error.224 The RSP
intends to form a technical evaluation team to assess developing
technologies to enhance runway safety. 2 2 5 In addition, the RSP
will continue to implement existing runway safety technology
such as ASDE-3 and AMASS, as well as develop new technologies
that can be implemented at airports of all sizes around the
United States. 226 However, the Blueprint contains no discussion
of how it plans to completely implement the over-budget and
behind-schedule AMASS system in the near future.
3. Communications Initiatives
The Communications Initiatives are intended to improve ra-
dio communications between air traffic controllers, pilots, and
vehicle operators on the airport surface. 22 7 The RSP plans to
provide guidelines on the level of English language proficiency
that foreign pilots must have in order to safely operate in the
airport environment and to standardize pilot/controller phrase-
ology in an effort to reduce confusion in communications.228
4. Procedures Initiatives
The Procedures Initiatives are intended to determine the im-
pact on the aviation community of a change in airport operating
procedures to enhance airport ground safety. 229 Included in
this group of initiatives are efforts to fund construction of pe-
rimeter roads for airport ground vehicles to segregate them
from aircraft operations. 230 In addition, the RSP will determine
if the CFRs should be amended to require pilots to obtain con-
troller clearances prior to crossing any runway, not just the ac-
tive runway.23' Importantly, the Blueprint indicates that where a
specific controller clearance has not been obtained to cross a
224 IJ&
225 Id. at 16.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 16.
228 Id. at 17.
229 Id.
230 Id.
23 1 Id. See also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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runway, the pilot should stop short of crossing the runway and
wait for clearance to cross.23 2
5. Airport Signs, Markings, and Lighting Initiatives
These initiatives are intended to improve the safety of the air-
port surface environment by improving the visibility and reada-
bility of airport signs and lighting that guide pilots to various
locations on the airport surface in an effort to prevent pilots
from becoming lost.2 3 The Blueprint calls for inspection teams
to evaluate the quality of airport surface signage and lighting as
well as encourages the use of funds to improve signs and lights
where needed.234 Interestingly, this was the precise task of the
NASAO, whose contract for runway safety inspections was not
renewed by the FAA due to budget concerns.
235
6. Data, Analysis, and Metrics Initiatives
As discussed previously, the true scope of the runway incur-
sion problem cannot be accurately measured because the qual-
ity and accuracy of runway incursion data is suspect. This set of
initiatives is intended to improve runway incursion data collec-
tion and analysis to aid the RSP in evaluating the effectiveness of
other runway safety initiatives, as well as to provide insight into
the precise causes of runway incursions.236 For example, the
RSP intends to establish and maintain universal databases of
runway incursion data and develop software tools that make
data analysis easier and more useful.23 7
7. Local Solutions Initiatives
This set of initiatives is intended to provide support to local
aviation authorities to improve runway safety at the local level
and share "lessons learned" between air traffic facilities across
the nation. 38
It is interesting to note that the seven major initiatives
presented in the Blueprint closely follow the ten near-term ini-
tiatives presented by the FAA in August 2000. Many of these
232 2000 BLUEPRINT, supra note 215, at 17.
233 ]d. at 18.
2" Id. at 19.
235 See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
236 2000 BLUEPRINT, supra note 215, at 19
237 Id.
238 Id. at 20.
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same initiatives were also included in the failed Runway Incur-
sion Plans developed in the 1990s. It now appears as if the FAA
and the RSP are narrowly focusing their efforts on the factors
they believe to be at the heart of the runway incursion problem.
Furthermore, the Blueprint recognizes that human factors are
an integral part of the seven major safety initiatives since human
beings (pilots, controllers, and ground personnel) must be in-
volved in all aspects of those initiatives.239
Despite its narrower focus, the Blueprint still contains serious
flaws that may affect efforts to improve runway safety. For exam-
ple, the 2000 Blueprint apparently has a life of only one year.
The 2000 Blueprint specifically calls for the creation of another
Blueprint due for release in October 2001.240 In order for a run-
way safety program to be effective, it should look to the long-
term and not focus on a single year of activity. While it is obvi-
ous that runway safety initiatives may need to be modified as
they are implemented over time, the current Blueprint provides
no goals for the long-term reduction of runway incursions. Spe-
cifically, the Blueprint contains a list of milestone dates and ac-
tivities, none of which extend past October 2001.241 Runway
incursions have been occurring since at least 1929 and the world
has witnessed numerous ground collision disasters in the last
quarter century. A long-term outlook with long-term goals
should be established so that the aviation community has a mea-
surable goal to work toward and measure its progress against.
Prior Runway Incursion Plans have looked to a long-term time
frame to establish goals for runway incursion reduction. Unfor-
tunately, as discussed above, all of those initiatives have fallen
short for various reasons. It is plausible that the FAA has pur-
posely left out any measurable goals - such as a long-term target
for the TRIR - for improving runway safety since they have an
established record of setting runway safety goals and failing to
meet them.
In addition, the current Blueprint is devoid of any detailed
discussion of how the enumerated safety initiatives will be imple-
mented. In effect, the Blueprint is merely an outline with only a
general discussion of the planned initiatives. There is little dis-
cussion of budgetary limitations or allotments to the various ini-
tiatives or time frames when the activities of the initiatives will be
239 Id.
240 Id. at 29.
241 See id. at 24-29.
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expected to produce results or what those results may be. In
essence, the current Blueprint is similar to the prior failed Run-
way Incursion Plans.
The runway incursion safety initiative appears to be reborn
once again. However, continual rebirth is clearly not what is re-
quired to solve the potential disaster that runway incursions
pose to the flying public. Long-term vision is required to see the
program through fruition and develop a safer aviation infra-
structure. Outlines of a course of action are very necessary to
guide the runway incursion program. However, without a de-
tailed set of executable plans, it is possible that the current
Blueprint will fall flat, as have its predecessor plans. Identifiable
and measurable goals are an absolute necessity so that the RSP
can access how far it must go to reach its goals and what must be
done to keep the RSP on track. The FAA has been creating run-
way incursion plans for over a decade, yet there has been nearly
nonexistent beneficial execution of those plans.
D. AN ASSESSMENT OF RUNWAY INCURSION DATA FROM 2000
As this article when to publication, the last full year of availa-
ble FAA data concerning runway incursions was 2000. At the
end of 2000, official FAA data indicated that the total number of
runway incursions rose to 431.242 Table II shows the comparison
of runway incursion data between 1999 and 2000. 24
242 FAA, Runway Incursion Totals-CYOO vs. CY99, at http://www.faarsp.com/
daily/ritotOO-99.htm (last modified Apr. 26, 2001).
243 Id.
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TABLE II:
FAA RUNWAY INCURSION DATA - 2000 VS. 1999
Runway Incursions
Operational Vehicle/
Pilot Error/ Pedestrian Miscellaneous
Deviations Deviation Deviations Deviations 2 4 4  Totals
2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999
January 17 17 2 8 6 4 0 0 25 29
February 12 9 5 7 7 5 0 0 24 21
March 22 8 11 3 3 6 0 0 36 17
April 20 15 7 4 6 3 0 0 33 22
May 25 18 8 8 7 3 0 0 40 29
June 25 12 11 7 8 9 0 0 44 28
July 29 23 6 7 7 9 0 0 42 39
August 29 13 9 7 10 3 0 0 48 23
September 18 17 5 8 10 8 0 0 33 33
October 27 13 9 7 5 4 0 0 41 24
November 15 15 8 7 10 3 0 0 33 25
December 20 22 6 5 6 4 0 0 32 31
Yearly
Totals 259 182 87 78 85 61 0 0 431 321
The 2000 data represents a 34% increase in runway incursion
events over the 321 runway incursions reported in 1999. Total
aircraft operations for 2000 totaled 67,480,097, for a TRIR of
0.64.245 This represents a 36% increase in the TRIR from 1999
to 2000. Recall that in 1998, the FAA set a goal to reduce run-
way incursions to 248 by the year 2000.246 Therefore, the pre-
liminary year 2000 data shows a 74% increase over the FAA's
revised reduction goal (and a ten-fold increase over the original
year 2000 reduction goal of 41 incursions as targeted by the
1995 Plan). Runway incursions caused by Operational Errors/
Deviations increased nearly 12% to 87 incursions from the 78
incursions reported in 1999.247 Runway incursions caused by Pi-
lot Deviations rose nearly 42% to 259 incursions from the 182
incursions reported in 1999.248 Runway incursions caused by
244 The FAA has included the "Miscellaneous" category to cover incursion
situations that are not attributable to the other three deviation categories. For
example, a runway incursion caused by equipment failure would be included in
the "Miscellaneous" category. See FAA, 2000 Blueprint, supra note 215, at 2.
245 Data from Table I, supra Part II.C.
246 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
247 Data derived from Table II.
248 Id.
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Vehicle and Pedestrian Deviations increased by nearly 39% to 85
incursions from the 61 incursions reported in 1999.249 The dis-
tribution of causes leading to runway incursions remained rela-
tively constant from 1999 to 2000 with Pilot Deviations causing
approximately 60% of all runway incursions.
An in-depth analysis of the effect of the FAA's year 2000 run-
way safety activities on runway incursion occurrences is difficult
for a variety of reasons. First, the monthly fluctuations in the
number of runway incursions are apparent in the data from
both 1999 and 2000. As such, it is difficult to determine if the
monthly changes in the number of runway incursions in 2000
are a result of the various safety activities conducted by the FAA
in 2000, or if those changes are simply a function of the fluctua-
tion in total airport operations throughout the various travel
seasons of the year.
Furthermore, it is possible that the drastic increase in re-
ported runway incursions from 1999 to 2000 is not the result of
the increasing number of actual incursions, but rather, a result
of the increasing awareness of incursions. 2 0 As the FAA issues
more information on runway incursions, as done through the
various programs it conducted in 2000, pilots and air traffic con-
trollers are becoming increasingly aware of the problem and its
causes. While it is impractical to assume that the number of ac-
tual runway incursions has remained constant from 1999 to
2000, it is possible that the major factor in the increase in re-
ported runway incursions is an increased awareness of when a
runway incursion has occurred. As pilots and air traffic control-
lers become more aware of the FAA's efforts to reduce incur-
sions, they may be assessing airport traffic situations more
critically and realizing that an incident meets the FAA's defini-
tion of a runway incursion and reporting the incident as such.
In this respect, the FAA's safety initiative to increase the reliabil-
ity of runway incursion data may be laying the foundation for a
better assessment of the runway incursion problem. However, it
is critical to note that no matter how the data is being reported
- actual increases of runway incursions or an increased aware-
ness of a fairly constant number of incursions - it is clear, as
mentioned above, that the true scope of the runway incursion
problem is underestimated by the data.
249 Id.
250 The author notes that this could also be a factor in the increase in runway
incursions from 1988 to 1999. See Table I, supra Part I.(C).
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However, as a point of reference, if we assume that all runway
incursions are reported accurately and that the runway incur-
sion numbers for 2000 represent only an increase in actual run-
way incursions, the scope of the increase in runway incursion
danger comes into focus. Assuming that the 431 runway incur-
sions reported in 2000 represent the true number of actual in-
cursions, the data analysis described previously indicates that by
the year 2010 (if current trends are not reversed), the United
States may experience as many as 1,983 runway incursions per
year (nearly 5.5 incursions per day) for a Total Runway Incur-
sion Rate of 2.37.251
E. 2001 BRINGS MARGINAL PROGRESS IN RUNWAY SAFETY
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, had a dramatic ef-
fect on air travel in the United States. From September 11t"
through the end of the year, air traffic was drastically reduced as
airlines cancelled flights and the public avoided air travel. As
such, airport operations for the last four months of 2001 are
expected to be much lower than for the same period in the pre-
vious years. Therefore, an analysis of runway incursion data for
all of 2001 would not yield much useful comparative informa-
tion since one-third of that data would be skewed by the severe
reduction in air traffic caused by the terrorist attacks. However,
useful comparisons may be made between the first eight months
of 2001 and the same time period in 2000.
Preliminary runway incursion data for the first eight months
of 2001 indicate a slight improvement in runway safety com-
pared with the first eight months of 2000. Table III shows the
comparison of runway incursion data between January and Au-
gust of 2000 and 2001.252
251 See supra notes 41 and 43 and accompanying text.
252 FAA, Runway Incursion Totals - CYO vs. CYOO, at http://www.faarsp.com/
daily/xritotOl-00.htm (last modified Apr. 1, 2002).
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TABLE III:
FAA RUNWAY INCURSION DATA - 2001 VS. 2000
(JANUARY - AUGUST)
Time Period Runway Incursions
Operational Vehicle/
Pilot Error/ Pedestrian Miscellaneous
Deviations Deviation Deviations Deviations 2 5 3  Totals
2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000
January 15 17 4 2 5 6 0 0 24 25
February 18 12 9 5 6 7 0 0 33 24
March 25 22 11 11 3 3 0 0 39 36
April 22 20 7 7 6 6 0 0 33 33
May 25 25 8 8 4 7 0 0 37 40
June 26 25 12 11 4 8 0 0 42 44
July 10 29 9 6 18 7 0 0 37 42
August 16 29 6 9 9 10 0 0 31 48
January-
August
Totals 157 179 66 59 55 54 0 0 278 292
The eight-month data for 2001 indicates that the runway in-
cursion problem at U.S. airports has improved slightly in the last
year.. The total number of runway incursions for the first eight-
month of 2001 has decreased slightly (down 4.8%) compared to
the same time period in 2000.254 In particular, runway incur-
sions attributed to Pilot Deviations decreased approximately
12%, while Operational Errors and Deviations increased ap-
proximately 12%.215 Vehicle and Pedestrian Deviations re-
mained relatively constant.2 6 Through the first eight months of
2001, U.S. airports experienced 278 runway incursions. Had
tragic events not intervened on September 1 1 th, U.S. airports
were on track to experience 415 runway incursions - a mere 5%
reduction from the 431 runway incursions of 2000.
The data in Table III indicates that the FAA's ten "Near Term
Safety Initiatives" might be starting to produce the improvement
in runway safety that the FAA anticipated. However, none of the
ten near term safety initiatives met the criteria set by the FAA
253 The FAA has included the "Miscellaneous" category to cover incursion
situations that are not attributable to the other three deviation categories. For
example, a runway incursion caused by equipment failure would be included in
the "Miscellaneous" category. See FAA, 2000 Blueprint, supra note 215, at 2.
254 Data derived from Table III.
255 Id.
256 Id.
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when those initiatives were selected.2 57 As discussed previously
in Part VI. (B), the near term safety initiatives were partially se-
lected on the basis that they could be implemented by Septem-
ber 1, 2000, and completed by the end of 2000.258 However, as
of June 2001, 90% of the near term initiatives remained incom-
plete.259 In fact, two of those initiatives will not be completed
until the first quarter of 2002.260 The incomplete implementa-
tion of these safety programs provides one possible explanation
for the lack of significant improvement in safety on the nation's
runways.
On a slightly positive note, in June 2001, the FAA released the
results of a statistical study of runway incursions at U.S. airports
between 1997 and 2000.261 This report classifies runway incur-
sions by orders of severity. The FAA noted that only 19% of all
events that meet the definition of a runway incursion result in a
significant potential for an actual collision, while 46% of all run-
way incursions create little or no chance for collision.262
VII. CONCLUSION
At the runway safety summit in June 2000, Jane Garvey, the
FAA Administrator, stated that "Improving runway safety has my
full attention . . . Improving runway safety is one of the most
critical aviation safety issues the aviation community faces. We
know how to meet challenges .. .Now, let's begin. 263
Administrator Garvey's words are curious in light of that fact
that the FAA actually began initial runway incursion safety activi-
ties prior to 1986. Since 1991, when the FAA developed its first
formalized runway safety improvement plan, no ascertainable
improvement in runway safety has occurred, despite the fact
that Congress had appropriated over $330 million to runway in-
cursion programs through Fiscal Year 1998. In fact, each of the
FAA's successive runway safety plans has failed to achieve its
stated goals.
Perhaps the biggest failure in the runway safety program is the
continuing inadequacy of accurate runway incursion data.
Nearly fifteen years ago, the NTSB criticized the FAA for its lack
257 See Technology Testimony, supra note 47, at Attachment E.
258 See supra Part VI. (B).
259 See Technology Testimony, supra note 47, at Attachment E.
2 6 See id.
261 RUNWAY INCURSION SEVEmrry REPORT, supra note 18.
262 Id. at 9-10.
263 Garvey Remarks, supra note 1.
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of measurable data. Since that time, every runway incursion
plan has included an initiative focusing on improving data col-
lection and analysis, yet every review of the FAA's efforts has
pointed out that little improvement has occurred. Without ac-
curate data, the starting point for any type of analysis, a true
understanding of the runway incursion problem will elude those
attempting to improve runway safety. The FAA should redouble
its efforts to improve data collection and analysis, starting with
control tower airports. Once accurate data is obtained for these
most critical locations (accounting for only 4% of all U.S. air-
ports), the FAA must look to quantifying the problem at the re-
maining uncontrolled airports. Only then can an accurate
picture of the nationwide runway incursion problem be ob-
tained, and efforts directed at achieving a safer aviation
infrastructure.
While the "severity statistics" presented in the FAA's June
2001 report may alleviate some fear among the flying public,
those data must be viewed with extreme caution, as the numbers
tend to downplay the danger on the nation's runways. Admit-
tedly, the majority of all runway incursions do not result in a
significant risk of collision. However, the lower risk of a colli-
sion is merely a matter of circumstance rather than an airport
operating system performing at its safest. Runway incursions of
any severity are caused by human and mechanical error and
those errors must be reduced. The same mistakes that cause a
runway incursion of the slightest severity can also result in a col-
lision as catastrophic as the Tenerife disaster. It is those errors
that must be corrected through FAA initiatives.
As discussed above, many other problems have plagued the
FAA's efforts to improve runway safety - failing to achieve incur-
sion reduction goals, focusing on the wrong areas for improve-
ment, failing to comply with statutory regulations regarding
runway safety, and failure of technological solutions to come to
fruition. All of these shortcomings must be eliminated to make
the FAA's runway incursion initiatives a reality. It remains to be
seen whether the 2000 Blueprint will be a more successful safety
plan than it predecessors. As the Blueprint's safety initiatives
are merely restatements of the initiatives presented in the previ-
ous runway safety plans, it appears as though only improved exe-
cution of those initiatives will make airport ground operations
safer. The lives of the flying public are in the hands of the FAA
administration and their ability to effectively implement the
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2000 Blueprint (and its successors) is vital to improving aviation
safety.
In an interview with CBS News, Bob Bragg, the co-pilot of the
PanAm 747 involved in the Tenerife disaster, accurately
summed up prior efforts at reducing runway incursions: "It
seems like we have to have a major accident before things like
this [runway incursions] get taken care of. My point is, it's
twenty-three years after we were talking about doing something
and we still have not done anything about it."' 264 Now is not the
time for the FAA to "begin" its efforts-it is time for the FAA to
quickly and effectively act to improve a struggling aviation safety
program of national importance. It is now time to for the FAA
to prove to the flying public that the FAA knows how to meet
challenges and is focusing its attention on reducing runway in-
cursions at U.S. airports.
In light of the great tragedies of September 11, 2001, it is im-
portant to remember that the worldwide aviation system faces
many other safety challenges beyond those caused by terrorist
acts. While the immediate focus of aviation safety is on prevent-
ing acts of terrorism on-board commercial airlines, many other
safety risks, present before the New York, Washington D.C., and
Pennsylvania terrorist attacks, continue to expose the flying pub-
lic to danger. The FAA and other aviation safety authorities
must continue to focus on all issues affecting aviation safety.
While it is likely that progress in other aviation safety programs
will be temporarily sacrificed for the benefit of reducing aviation
terrorism, we must all remember that many other safety risks
must be addressed before the aviation system reaches more ac-
ceptable levels of safety. Congress must continue to provide
funding and personnel to the myriad of programs created to
reduce the safety risks inherent in the aviation system. Aviation
authorities around the world should bear in mind the potential
long-term negative effects of focusing solely on safety issues re-
sulting from recent world events to the detriment of other press-
ing safety concerns.
2-64 CBS News, Daily Close Calls on U.S. Runways (May 10, 2000), at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2000/05/ 1 O/eveningnews/ main 194136.shtml.
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